In a case decided yesterday, a jury verdict awarding $750,000 in compensatory damages and $300,00 in punitive damages, as well as an approx. $130,000 in back pay and front pay, was upheld by the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals. Click here to read the decision: West v. Tyson

One interesting issue involved the defendant’s request that the compensatory damage award of $750,000 be remitted. (Opinion at 29-31).

At trial, the plaintiff requested that the jury award up to $500,000 in compensatory damages. Notwithstanding the plaintiff’s request, the jury proceeded to award the plaintiff $750,000 ($500,000 for past emotional distress and $250,000 for ongoing emotional distress). Now, this is my kind of jury.

On appeal, the defendant argued that an award of compensatory damages beyond that requested by the plaintiff must be remitted. This argument was rejected by the 6th Circuit.

While it acknowledged that an award in excess of that requested was a factor to be considered when entertaining a motion for remittitur, the Court disagreed that it was bound as a matter of law to reduce the award to an amount that had been requested. Instead, the Court held that the proper legal standard simply required it to determine whether the award “is beyond the maximum damages that the jury reasonably could find to be compensatory for a party’s loss.” (Op. at 30). And based on the Court’s review of the evidence, an award of $750,000 was not beyond the max a jury could have awarded.

Yesterday, Magistrate Judge Tu M. Pham from the Western District of Tennessee issued a decision granting a plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment in a FMLA case. The name of the case is Green v. Third Party Solutions, Inc. and a copy of the decision can be accessed by clicking here. SJ Order. There are a couple of interesting points in the decision.

First, the court found that the defendant had interfered with the plaintiff’s FMLA rights thus finding in favor of the plaintiff on her FMLA interference claim. (SJ Order at 12-19). The court found that the defendant improperly terminated the plaintiff’s employment based on its belief that the plaintiff had not submitted a properly completed health care provider certification form regarding her FMLA leave request. Specifically, the court held that the FMLA certification form completed by the healthcare provider was sufficiently complete as a matter of law even though the form did not set forth an end duration date. As a result, the court held that the defendant illegally interferred with plaintiff’s FMLA rights.

Second, the court held that the defendant had waived its right to raise and rely on an after-acquired evidence defense, which would cut off the plaintiff’s damages if successful. The defendant argued that it discovered during litigation that the plaintiff had lied on her job application; therefore, plaintiff’s damages should be cut off as of the date it learned of plaintiff’s deception.

As an initial matter, the court agreed “with the majority of the courts and conclude[d] that the after-acquired evidence defense is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded under [FRCP] Rule 8(c).” (SJ Order at 26-27). The court next found that the defendant had not raised the after-acquired evidence defense in its answer waiting to first raise the matter in its motion for summary judgment. The court then held that the plaintiff would be prejudiced if it permitted the defendant to raise the defense after the close of discovery. Thus, the court determined that the defendant had waived its right to raise and rely on the after-acquired evidence defense.

Nice win for the plaintiff in this case.

A recent case from the Eastern District of Tennessee discusses the enforcement of settlement agreements in a FLSA case. See Solis v. Magana, 2010 WL 1257859 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2010).

In this case, the defendant agreed to settle a FLSA case brought by the U.S. Department of Labor. The amount of the settlement was agreed upon, as well as a payment schedule. Some months later, before the Court had approved the final settlement, the defendant sought to modify the payment schedule. The DOL refused and sought to enforce the parties’ agreement. The defendant argued that not all material terms had been agreed on by the parties, but the court rejected that argument.

As an initial matter, the court agreed with the defendant that before enforcing a settlement agreement, a court must conclude that the parties have agreed on all material terms. The court found, however, that all material terms had indeed been agreed upon.

The defendant’s change in financial circumstances, which caused the defendant to seek modification to the settlement agreement’s payment schedule, was not a sufficient basis for the court to find that an agreement had not bee reached in the first instance. The court noted that an employer’s economic hardship is not a valid ground for opposing the entry of an order relating to FLSA violations.

A recent decision from the Western District of Tennesee discusses and rejects an employer’s use of the “honest belief” rule in a retaliation case. The case is Turner v. Hoops, L.P. and can be accessed here: Turner v. Hoops

Here are the facts:

Riley Turner, who worked in the engineering department for Hoops, L.P. at the FedEx Forum in Memphis, alleged he was retaliated against after he complained about race discrimination against himself and about a co-worker who was subject to sexual harassment.

Turner was subsequently terminated by Hoops, L.P. because its investigation into the sexual harassment charges brought by Turner’s co-worker allegedly revealed that Turner had viewed pornographic images on his work computer. Turner denied that he ever viewed such images on his work computer.

Hoops argued that it didn’t matter whether Turner actually viewed such images since it performed a good faith investigation and had an “honest belief” that Turner viewed such images.

Judge McCalla rejected this argument permitting a jury to decide whether Hoops’ decision to Turner for allegedly viewing porn was a pretext for retaliation. (Order at 18-20).

Judge McCalla noted that in addition to Turner’s denial that he viewed these images, Hoops admitted to losing the computer hard drive, which would have potentially exonerated Turner. Accordingly, Judge McCalla held that “the loss of the hard drive containing the information relating to Plaintiff’s viewing of pornography precludes Defendant’s reliance on the honest belief rule as a matter of law.” (Order at 19).